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## THE HOJ PROJECT


- 1. The Bund Doutsche Jurend or League of German Youth was established by Paul Egon Laseth in early 1950 as a youth grow that would rally German youth to the cause of vestern democracy and combat Communism. Leath approached the U.S. High Commission and requested support for his plans, which included the activation of an underground network in castern Germany. The HICCG officials fult that this type of activity could be better handled by a covert intelligence agency and placed Lueth in contact with a CIA representative.
- 2. Under CIA guidence, the Leegue of German Youth was developed as a large-scale propagants organization. Its first whipr compaise was a series of eperations directed against the Soviet None elections which were held in the fall of 1950. The League, itself, functioned as a CIA mechanism for psychological variage from the summer of 1950 up until the disclosures which took place in October 1952.
- 3. During that time, it conducted active compaigns on behalf of the Schumman Plan, on West German integration into western Europe, and in support of other U.S. policy objectives. Its major effort was concentrated on the emposure and negation of the Communist propaganda efforts. In addition, it took a decided stand against the revival of national socialism or env other form of rightist totalitarismism in Germany and Europe.

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- 4. As a result of the outbreak of the Kerean War in the summer of 1950, the Department of Defense placed maximum value on the immediate creation of retardation forces in all forward areas, including vestern Germany. The State Department, in a policy paper, recommended that all groups that could contribute to resistance efforts should be contacted.
- 5. GIA, in its search for a suitable resistance potential, reviewed the possibilities that were presented by the League of German Youth and developed an organisational plan to separate suitable staybehind assets and personnel from the League. These latter were to be developed as a separate claudestine unit for substage and guarrilla war-fare operations.
- 6. The initial phase of this plan called for the spetting and recruitment of regional leaders for each governmental district in Germany and for the training of indigenous instructors. At a later date, additional personnel were to be recruited as stay-behind units. U.S. High Commissioner McCloy was informed of these plans during the developmental stages.
- 7. In January 1951, the principal agent, who had severed his official commentions with the League of Gorman Youth, had spotted three men in each land as the top cadre for his organization. He was given his first assignment which was a collection effort to gather information on certain Soviet Zone airfields that were of great interest to the U.S. Air Force.





9. During this stand-by period, a review of the policies and operations of the project was initiated in Washington. This eminimated in the disputch to the field of a new policy on the MDJ Apparet in December 1951. The field was advised that no large-scale proparations for guarrilla variare or other types of stay-behind should be undertaken without the knowledge and cooperation of the West German Government. The field was also requested to review the present status of the MDJ Apparet with this in mind and to restrict its activities to a limited "hedge" operation. If this could not be done successfully, it was recommended that the operation be terminated.

10. After a careful review of the operations, the field came to the conclusion that continued operations were not feesible and erdered that the project be terminated in the spring of 1952. Operational phase-out was initiated in May 1952 and had been completed by September 1952.

11. On 13 September, the Hessian police raised the homes of the CIA staff agent and the German principal agents and recovered certain classified information which these persons had failed to destroy. In a number of successive meetings, the U.S. High Commissioner Reber and the

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Chief of the German Mission, General Trascott, attempted to dissuade Mession Minister President Simm and the federal SPD Chairman, Dr. Clienhauer, from any action that would embarrase the U.S. Government, but these negotiations failed.

12. Eins made public his charges against the MDJ Apparet on 8 October 1952 in a speech before the Heasian Landing. The statements made by the U.S. High Commission at that time admitted that U.S. support had been given to the preparations for step-behind activities by the paramilitary group, but disclaimed any knowledge of internal political activities, including the Zinn charges that a number of proximent SPD officials were to be liquidated.

13. On 23 October 1952, Minister Fresident Kinn agreed to the terms of reference for a joint U.S.-German Committee of Inquiry, which would examine the evidence produced by the police investigations. This Committee functioned until the 31st of October, when the U.S. member objected to the emission of pertinent facts from the protocol prepared by the German Committee Chairman. These emissions of certain testimony reflected the effort of the Commission Chairman to substantiate the original Kinn charges. The German Chairman of the Committee refused to recognise the U.S. member's objections and the hearings were broken off.

14. Thereupon, additional consultations were held between the U.S.

High Commission and the German representatives. It was agreed to suspend
the work of the joint Commission pending the outcome of the investigation
by the office of the Vest German Federal Prosecutor.

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- 15. Investigation by the German Pederal Prosecutor, as far as it can be assertained, has borne out the findings of the U.S. member of the joint Commission. That is, there is no evidence to support Zinn's charge that the lists compiled by the Apparat were to be used for the liquidation of prominent SFD officials in time of war.
- 16. The parentlitary group did discuss the question of taking prisoners during a German warfare compaign and also the need for liquidation of all traiters or informants within their own groups in wartime. This, however, was entirely different from the charge that they had prepared liquidation lists or that they would liquidate the persons named in these various lists in the event of Soviet aggression.
- 17. It should be pointed out that the Apparat did prepare a list of over 1,000 Communists, which was subsequently turned over to CIC for explaination. It was understood that the known Communists on these lists would be dealt with by the Allied troops in the event of Soviet aggression.
- 18. On 13 November 1952, the Federal Prosecutor released from custody all EDJ Apparat members with the statement that there was no evidence of illegal activity on their part. Subsequently, the Ressian Government requested the West German Government to ben the League of German Touth, itself, throughout the entire Federal Republic on the basis that the League was tied in with the Apparat's paramilitary activities. Public identification of the Apparat's activities with the League of German Touth seems to have been a primary objective of Minister President Zimn



and his Social Democratic associates. When the Federal Government stated that the benning of organizations was a matter for the states to decide, the Hessian Government benned the League of German Youth. The Land Governments of Hamburg, Bremen and Lower Saxony have taken similar action.

- 19. The former Federal leaders of the League have been charged by the Hessian Government and will be examined on 2 February 1953 by the investigation judge of the Land Court.
  - 20. The attached cable summarises the latest developments.

28 January 1953 Attachment

